Crowdsourcing markets have emerged as a popular platform for matching available workers with tasks to complete. The payment for a particular task is typically set by the task's requester, and may be adjusted based on the quality of the completed work, for example, through the use of "bonus" payments. In this paper, we study the requester's problem of dynamically adjusting quality-contingent payments for tasks. We consider a multi-round version of the well-known principal-agent model, whereby in each round a worker makes a strategic choice of the effort level which is not directly observable by the requester. In particular, our formulation significantly generalizes the budget-free online task pricing problems studied in prior work.
INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing harnesses human intelligence and common sense to complete tasks that are difficult to accomplish using computers alone. Crowdsourcing markets, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk and Microsoft's Universal Human Relevance System, are platforms designed to match available human workers with tasks to complete. Using these platforms, requesters may post tasks that they would like completed, along with the amount of money they are willing to pay. Workers then choose whether or not to accept the available tasks and complete the work.
Of course not all human workers are equal, nor is all human-produced work. Some tasks, such as proofreading English text, are easier for some workers than others, re-All missing proofs and the plots for the simulations can be found in the full version, which is available at arxiv.org. The full version also presents an application to dynamic pricing of tasks, a more detailed discussion of related work, and other supplementary material. Much of this research was completed while Ho was an intern at Microsoft Research. This research was partially supported by the NSF under grant IIS-1054911. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations are those of the authors alone.
quiring less effort to produce high quality results. Additionally, some workers are more dedicated than others, willing to spend extra time to make sure a task is completed properly. To encourage high quality results, requesters may set quality-contingent "bonus" payments on top of the base payment for each task, rewarding workers for producing valuable output. This can be viewed as offering workers a "contract" that specifies how much they will be paid based on the quality of their output. 1 We examine the requester's problem of dynamically setting quality-contingent payments for tasks. We consider a setting in which time evolves in rounds. In each round, the requester posts a new contract, a performance-contingent payment rule which specifies different levels of payment for different levels of output. A random, unidentifiable worker then arrives in the market and strategically decides whether to accept the requester's task and how much effort to exert; the choice of effort level is not directly observable by the requester. After the worker completes the task (or chooses not to complete it), the requester observes the worker's output, pays the worker according to the offered contract, and adjusts the contract for the next round. The goal of the requester is to maximize his expected utility, the value he receives from completed work minus the payments made. We call it the dynamic contract design problem.
We treat this problem as a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, with each arm representing a potential contract. Since the action space is large (potentially infinite) and has a well-defined real-valued structure, it is natural to consider an algorithm that uses discretization. Our algorithm, AgnosticZooming, divides the action space into regions, and chooses among these regions, effectively treating each region as a single "meta-arm." The discretization is defined adaptively, so that the more promising areas of the action space are eventually discretized more finely than the less promising areas. While the general idea of adaptive discretization has appeared in prior work on MAB [Bubeck et al. 2011; Slivkins 2011a,b] , our approach to adaptive discretization is new and problem-specific. The main difficulty, compared to this prior work, is that an algorithm is not given any information that links the observable numerical structure of contracts and the expected utilities thereof.
To analyze performance, we propose a concept called "width dimension" which measures how "nice" a particular problem instance is. We show that AgnosticZooming achieves regret sublinear in the time horizon for problem instances with small width dimension. In particular, if the width dimension is d, it achieves regret O(log T · T (d+1)/(d+2) ) after T rounds. For problem instances with large width dimension, AgnosticZooming matches the performance of the naive algorithm which uniformly discretizes the space and runs a standard bandit algorithm. We illustrate our general results via some special cases, including an improvement over the prior work on dynamic task pricing. We support the theoretical results with simulations.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. We define a broad, practically important setting; identify novel problem-specific structure, for both the algorithm and the regret bounds; distill ideas from prior work to work with these structures; argue that our approach is productive by deriving corollaries and comparing to prior work; and identify and analyze specific examples where our theory applies. The main conceptual contribution is the adaptive discretization approach mentioned above.
Related work.
Our work builds on three areas of research. First, our model can be viewed as a multi-round version of the classical principal-agent model from contract theory [Laffont and Martimort 2002] : the single round of our model corresponds to the basic principal-agent setting. However, our techniques are very different from those employed in contract theory.
Second, our methods build on those developed in the rich literature on MAB with continuous outcome spaces. The closest line of work is that on Lipschitz MAB , in which the algorithm is given a distance function on the arms, and the expected rewards of the arms are assumed to satisfy Lipschitz-continuity (or a relaxation thereof) with respect to this distance function, [Agrawal 1995; Auer et al. 2007; Bubeck et al. 2011; Kleinberg 2004; Slivkins 2011a] . Most related to our techniques is the idea of adaptive discretization [Bubeck et al. 2011; Slivkins 2011a] , and in particular, the zooming algorithm Slivkins 2011a ]. However, the zooming algorithm cannot be applied directly in our setting because the required numerical similarity information is not immediately available. This problem also arises in web search and advertising, where it is natural to assume that an algorithm can only observe a tree-shaped taxonomy on arms [Kocsis and Szepesvari 2006; Munos and Coquelin 2007; Pandey et al. 2007] which can be used to explicitly reconstruct relevant parts of the underlying metric space [Slivkins 2011b ]. We take a different approach, using a notion of "virtual width" to estimate similarity information. Explicit comparisons between our results and prior MAB work are made throughout the paper.
Finally, our work follows several other theoretical papers on pricing in crowdsourcing markets. The problem closest to ours which has been studied in this context is dynamic task pricing , which is essentially the special case of our setting where in each round a worker is offered to perform a task at a specified price, and can either accept or reject this offer [Badanidiyuru et al. 2012 [Badanidiyuru et al. , 2013 Kleinberg and Leighton 2003; Singer and Mittal 2013; Singla and Krause 2013] . 2 In particular, in this setting the worker's strategic choice is directly observable.
A more thorough literature review can be found in the full version.
OUR SETTING: THE DYNAMIC CONTRACT DESIGN PROBLEM
In this section, we formally define the problem that we set out to solve. We start by describing a static model, which captures what happens in a single round of interaction between a requester and a worker. As described above, this is a version of the standard principal-agent model [Laffont and Martimort 2002] . We then define our dynamic model, an extension of the static model to multiple rounds, with a new worker arriving each round. We then detail the objective of our pricing algorithm and the simplifying assumptions that we make throughout the paper. Finally, we compare our setting to the classic multi-armed bandit problem.
Static model. We begin with a description of what occurs during each interaction between the requester and a single worker. The requester first posts a task which may be completed by the worker, and a contract specifying how the worker will be paid if she completes the task. If the task is completed, the requester pays the worker as specified in the contract, and the requester derives value from the completed task; for normalization, we assume that the value derived is in [0, 1]. The requester's utility from a given task is this value minus the payment to the worker. When the worker observes the contract and decides whether or not to complete the task, she also chooses a level of effort to exert, which in turn determines her cost (in terms of time, energy, or missed opportunities) and a distribution over the quality of her work. To model quality, we assume that there is a (small) finite set of possible outcomes that result from the worker completing the task (or choosing not to complete it), and that the realized outcome determines the value that the requester derives from the task. The realized outcome is observed by the requester, and the contract that the requester offers is a mapping from outcomes to payments for the worker.
We emphasize two crucial (and related) features of the principal-agent model: that the mapping from effort level to outcomes can be randomized, and that the effort level is not directly observed by the requester. This is in line with a standard observation in crowdsourcing that even honest, high-effort workers occasionally make errors.
The worker's utility from a given task is the payment from the requester minus the cost corresponding to her chosen effort level. Given the contract she is offered, the worker chooses her effort level strategically so as to maximize her expected utility. Crucially, the chosen effort level is not directly observable by the requester.
The worker's choice not to perform a task is modeled as a separate effort level of zero cost (called the null effort level) and a separate outcome of zero value and zero payment (called the null outcome) such that the null effort level deterministically leads to the null outcome, and it is the only effort level that can lead to this outcome.
The mapping from outcomes to the requester's value is called the requester's value function. The mapping from effort levels to costs is called the cost function, and the mapping from effort levels to distributions over outcomes is called the production function. For the purposes of this paper, a worker is completely specified by these two functions; we say that the cost function and the production function comprise the worker's type. Unlike some traditional versions of the principal-agent problem, in our setting a worker's type is not observable by the requester, nor is any prior given.
Dynamic model. The dynamic model we consider in this paper is a natural extension of the static model to multiple rounds and multiple workers. We are still concerned with just a single requester. In each round, a new worker arrives. We assume a stochastic environment in which the worker's type in each round is an i.i.d. sample from some fixed and unknown distribution over types, called the supply distribution. The requester posts a new task and a contract for this task. All tasks are of the same type, in the sense that the set of possible effort levels and the set of possible outcomes are the same for all tasks. The worker strategically chooses her effort level so as to maximize her expected utility from this task. Based on the chosen effort level and the worker's production function, an outcome is realized. The requester observes this outcome (but not the worker's effort level) and pays the worker the amount specified by the contract. The type of the arriving worker is never revealed to the requester. The requester can adjust the contract from one round to another, and his total utility is the sum of his utility over all rounds. For simplicity, we assume that the number of rounds is known in advance, though this assumption can be relaxed using standard tricks.
The dynamic contract design problem. Throughout this paper, we take the point of view of the requester interacting with workers in the dynamic model. The algorithms we examine dynamically choose contracts to offer on each round with the goal of maximizing the requester's expected utility. A problem instance consists of several quantities, some of which are known to the algorithm, and some of which are not. The known quantities are the number of outcomes, the requester's value function, and the time horizon T (i.e., the number of rounds). The latent quantities are the number of effort levels, the set of worker types, and the supply distribution. The algorithm adjusts the contract from round to round and observes the realized outcomes but receives no other feedback.
We focus on contracts that are bounded (offer payments in [0, 1]), and monotone (assign equal or higher payments for outcomes with higher value for the requester). Let X be the set of all bounded, monotone contracts. We compare a given algorithm against a given subset of "candidate contracts" X cand ⊂ X. Letting OPT(X cand ) be the optimal utility over all contracts in X cand , the goal is to minimize the algorithm's regret R(T |X cand ), defined as T × OPT(X cand ) minus the algorithm's expected utility.
The subset X cand may be finite or infinite, possibly X cand = X. The most natural example of a finite X cand is the set of all bounded, monotone contracts with payments that are integer multiples of some ψ > 0; we call it the uniform mesh with granularity ψ, and denote it X cand (ψ).
Notation.
Let v(·) be the value function of the requester, with v(π) denoting the value of outcome π. Let O be the set of all outcomes and let m be the number of non-null outcomes. We will index the outcomes as O = {0, 1, 2 , . . . , m} in the order of increasing value (ties broken arbitrarily), with a convention that 0 is the null outcome.
Let c i (·) and f i (·) be the cost function and production function for type i. Then the cost of choosing effort level e is c i (e), and the probability of obtaining outcome π having chosen effort e is f i (π|e).
Recall that a contract x is a function from outcomes to (non-negative) payments. If contract x is offered to a worker sampled i.i.d. from the supply distribution, V (x) is the expected value to the requester, P (x) ≥ 0 is the expected payment, and
Assumption: First-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). Given two effort levels e and e ′ , we say that e has FOSD over e ′ for type i if F i (π|e) ≥ F i (π|e ′ ) for all outcomes π, with a strict inequality for at least one outcome. 3 We say that type i satisfies the FOSD assumption if for any two distinct effort levels, one effort level has FOSD over the other for type i. We assume that all types satisfy this assumption.
Assumption: Consistent tie-breaking. If multiple effort levels maximize the expected utility of a given worker for a contract x, we assume the tie is broken consistently in the sense that this worker chooses the same effort level for any contract that leads to this particular tie. This assumption is minor; it can be avoided (with minor technical complications) by adding random perturbations to the contracts. This assumption is implicit throughout the paper.
Discussion

Number of outcomes.
Our results assume a small number of outcomes. This regime is important in practice, as the quality of submitted work is typically difficult to evaluate in a very fine granularity. Even with m = 2 non-null outcomes, our setting has not been studied before. The special case m = 1 is equivalent to the dynamic pricing problem from Kleinberg and Leighton [2003] ; we obtain improved results for it, too.
The benchmark. Our benchmark OPT(·) only considers contracts that are bounded and monotone. In practice, restricting to such contracts may be appealing to all human parties involved. However, this restriction is not without loss of generality: there are problem instances in which monotone contracts are not optimal; see the full version for an example. Further, it is not clear whether bounded monotone contracts are optimal among monotone contracts.
Our benchmark OPT(X cand ) is relative to a given set X cand , which is typically a finite discretization of the contract space. There are two reasons for this. First, crowdsourcing platforms may require the payments to be multiples of some minimum unit (e.g., one cent), in which case it is natural to restrict our attention to contracts satisfying the same constraint. Second, achieving guarantees relative to OPT(X) for the full generality of our problem appears beyond the reach of our techniques. As in many other machine learning scenarios, it is useful to consider a restricted "benchmark set" -set of alternatives to compare to. 4 In such settings, it is considered important to handle arbitrary benchmark sets, which is what we do.
One known approach to obtain guarantees relative to OPT(X) is to start with some finite X cand ⊂ X, design an algorithm with guarantees relative to OPT(X cand ), and then, as a separate result, bound the discretization error OPT(X)−OPT(X cand ). Then the choice of X cand drives the tradeoff between the discretization error and regret R(T |X cand ), and one can choose X cand to optimize this tradeoff. However, while one can upper-bound the discretization error in some (very) simple special cases (see Section 5), it is unclear whether this can be extended to the full generality of dynamic contract design.
Alternative worker models. One of the crucial tenets in our model is that the workers maximize their expected utility. This "rationality assumption" is very standard in Economics, and is often used to make the problem amenable to rigorous analysis. However, there is a considerable literature suggesting that in practice workers may deviate from this "rational" behavior. Thus, it is worth pointing out that our results do not rely heavily on the rationality assumption. The FOSD assumption (which is also fairly standard) can be circumvented, too. In fact, all our assumptions regarding worker behavior serve only to enable us to prove Lemma 3.1, and more specifically to guarantee that the collective worker behavior satisfies the following natural property (which is used in the proof of Lemma 3.1): if the requester increases the "increment payment" (as described in the next section) for a particular outcome, the probability of obtaining an outcome at least that good also increases.
Comparison to multi-armed bandits (MAB). Dynamic contract design can be modeled as special case of the MAB problem with some additional, problem-specific structure. The basic MAB problem is defined as follows. An algorithm repeatedly chooses actions from a fixed action space and collects rewards for the chosen actions; the available actions are traditionally called arms. More specifically, time is partitioned into rounds, so that in each round the algorithm selects an arm and receives a reward for the chosen arm. No other information, such as the reward the algorithm would have received for choosing an alternative arm, is revealed. In an MAB problem with stochastic rewards, the reward of each arm in a given round is an i.i.d. sample from some distribution which depends on the arm but not on the round. A standard measure of algorithm's performance is regret with respect to the best fixed arm, defined as the difference in expected total reward between a benchmark (usually the best fixed arm) and the algorithm.
Thus, dynamic contract design can be naturally modeled as an MAB problem with stochastic rewards, in which arms correspond to monotone contracts. The prior work on MAB with large / infinite action spaces often assumes known upper bounds on similarity between arms. More precisely, this prior work would assume that an algorithm is given a metric D on contracts such that expected rewards are Lipschitz-continuous with respect to D, i.e., we have upper bounds |U (x) − U (y)| ≤ D(x, y) for any two contracts x, y. 5 However, in our setting such upper bounds are absent. On the other hand, our problem has some supplementary structure compared to the standard MAB setting. In particular, the algorithm's reward decomposes into value and payment, both of which are determined by the outcome, which in turn is probabilistically determined by the worker's strategic choice of the effort level. Effectively, this supplementary struc-ture provides some "soft" information on similarity between contracts, in the sense that numerically similar contracts are usually (but not always) similar to one another.
OUR ALGORITHM: AgnosticZooming
In this section, we specify our algorithm. We call it AgnosticZooming because it "zooms in" on more promising areas of the action space, and does so without knowing a precise measure of the similarity between contracts. This zooming can be viewed as a dynamic form of discretization. Before stating the algorithm itself, we discuss the discretization of the action space in more detail, laying the groundwork for our approach.
Discretization of the action space
In each round, the AgnosticZooming algorithm partitions the action space into several regions and chooses among these regions, effectively treating each region as a "metaarm." In this section, we discuss which subsets of the action space are used as regions, and introduce some useful notions and properties of such subsets.
Increment space and cells. To describe our approach to discretization, it is useful to think of contracts in terms of increment payments. Specifically, we represent each monotone contract
where m is the number of non-null outcomes and x π = x(π)−x(π−1) ≥ 0 for each non-null outcome π. (Recall that by convention 0 is the null outcome and x(0) = 0.) We call this vector the increment representation of contract x, and denote it incr(x). Note that if x is bounded, then incr(x) ∈ [0, 1] m . Conversely, call a contract weakly bounded if it is monotone and its increment representation lies in [0, 1] m . Such a contract is not necessarily bounded.
We discretize the space of all weakly bounded contracts, viewed as a multidimensional unit cube. More precisely, we define the increment space as [0, 1] m with a convention that every vector represents the corresponding weakly bounded contract. Each region in the discretization is a closed, axis-aligned m-dimensional cube in the increment space; henceforth, such cubes are called cells. A cell is called relevant if it contains at least one candidate contract. A relevant cell is called atomic if it contains exactly one candidate contract, and composite otherwise.
In each composite cell C, the algorithm will only use two contracts: the maximal corner, denoted x + (C), in which all increment payments are maximal, and the minimal corner, denoted x − (C), in which all increment payments are minimal. These two contracts are called the anchors of C. In each atomic cell C, the algorithm will only use one contract: the unique candidate contract, also called the anchor of C.
Virtual width. To take advantage of the problem structure, it is essential to estimate how similar the contracts within a given composite cell C are. Ideally, we would like to know the maximal difference in expected utility:
We estimate the width using a proxy, called virtual width, which is expressed in terms of the anchors:
This definition is one crucial place where the problem structure is used. (Note that it is not the difference in utility at the anchors.) It is useful due to the following lemma (proved in the full version). Recall that the proof of this lemma is the only place in the paper where we use our assumptions on worker behavior. All further developments hold for any model of worker behavior which satisfies Lemma 3.1.
Description of the algorithm
With these ideas in place, we are now ready to describe our algorithm. The high-level outline of AgnosticZooming is very simple. The algorithm maintains a set of active cells which cover the increment space at all times. Initially, there is only a single active cell comprising the entire increment space. In each round t, the algorithm chooses one active cell C t using an upper confidence index and posts contract x t sampled uniformly at random among the anchors of this cell. After observing the feedback, the algorithm may choose to zoom in on C t , removing C t from the set of active cells and activating all relevant quadrants thereof, where the quadrants of cell C are defined as the 2 m subcells of half the size for which one of the corners is the center of C. In the remainder of this section, we specify how the cell C t is chosen (the selection rule), and how the algorithm decides whether to zoom in on C t (the zooming rule).
Let us first introduce some notation. Consider cell C that is active in some round t. Let U (C) be the expected utility from a single round in which C is chosen by the algorithm, i.e., the average expected utility of the anchor(s) of C. Let n t (C) be the number of times this cell has been chosen before round t. Consider all rounds in which C is chosen by the algorithm before round t. Let U t (C) be the average utility over these rounds. For a composite cell C, let V + t (C) and P + t (C) be the average value and average payment over all rounds when anchor x + (C) is chosen. Similarly, let V − t (C) and P − t (C) be the average value and average payment over all rounds when anchor x − (C) is chosen. Accordingly, we can estimate the virtual width of composite cell C at time t as
) .
( 2) To bound the deviations, we define the confidence radius as
for some absolute constant c rad ; in our analysis, c rad ≥ 16 suffices. We will show that with high probability all sample averages defined above will stay within rad t (C) of the respective expectations. If this high probability event holds, the width estimate W t (C) will always be within 4 rad t (C) of VirtWidth(C).
Selection rule. Now we are ready to complete the algorithm. The selection rule is as follows. In each round t, the algorithm chooses an active cell C with maximal index I t (·). I t (C) is an upper confidence bound on the expected utility of any candidate contract in C, defined as
Zooming rule. We zoom in on a composite cell C t if
i.e., the uncertainty due to random sampling, expressed by the confidence radius, becomes sufficiently small compared to the uncertainty due to discretization, expressed by the virtual width. We never zoom in on atomic cells. The pseudocode is summarized in Algorithm 1. Integer payments. In practice it may be necessary to only allow contracts in which all payments are integer multiples of some amount ψ, e.g., whole cents. (In this case we can assume that candidate contracts have this property, too.) Then we can redefine the two anchors of each composite cell: the maximal (resp., minimal) anchor is the nearest allowed contract to the maximal (resp., minimal) corner. Width can be redefined as a sup over all allowed contracts in a given cell. With these modifications, the analysis goes through without significant changes. We omit further discussion of this issue.
REGRET BOUNDS AND DISCUSSION
We present the main regret bound for AgnosticZooming. Formulating this result requires some new, problem-specific structure. Stated in terms of this structure, the result is somewhat difficult to access. To explain its significance, we state several corollaries, and compare our results to prior work.
The main result. We start with the main regret bound. Like the algorithm itself, this regret bound is parameterized by the set X cand of candidate contracts; our goal is to bound the algorithm's regret with respect to candidate contracts. Recall that OPT(X cand ) = sup x∈Xcand U (x) is the optimal expected utility over candidate contracts. The algorithm's regret with respect to candidate contracts is R(T |X cand ) = T OPT(X cand ) − U , where T is the time horizon and U is the expected cumulative utility of the algorithm.
Define the badness ∆(x) of a contract x ∈ X as the difference in expected utility between an optimal candidate contract and x:
We will only be interested in cells that can potentially be used by AgnosticZooming. Formally, we recursively define a collection of feasible cells as follows: (i) the cell [0, 1] m is feasible, (ii) for each feasible cell C, all relevant quadrants of C are feasible. Note that the definition of a feasible cell implicitly depends on the set X cand of candidate contracts.
Let F ϵ denote the collection of all feasible, composite cells C such that
Using the structure defined above, the main theorem is stated as follows. We prove this theorem in Section 6. THEOREM 4.1. Consider the dynamic contract design problem with all types satisfying the FOSD assumption and a constant number of outcomes. Assume T ≥ max(2 m + 1, 18). Consider AgnosticZooming, parameterized by some set X cand of can-didate contracts. There is an absolute constant β 0 > 0 such that for any δ > 0,
Remark 4.2. As discussed in Section 2.1, we target the practically important case of a small number of outcomes. The impact of larger m is an exponential dependence on m in the O() notation, and, more importantly, increased number of candidate policies (typically exponential in m for a given granularity).
Remark 4.3. Our regret bounds do not depend on the number of worker types, in line with prior work on dynamic pricing. Essentially, this is because bandit approaches tend to depend only on expected reward of a given "arm" (and perhaps also on the variance), not the finer properties of the distribution. Equation (5) has a shape similar to several other regret bounds in the literature, as discussed below. To make this more apparent, we observe that regret bounds in "bandits in metric spaces" are often stated in terms of covering numbers. (For a fixed collection F of subsets of a given ground set X, the covering number of a subset Y ⊂ X relative to F is the smallest number of subsets in F that is sufficient to cover Y .) The numbers N ϵ (Y |X cand ) are, essentially, about covering Y with feasible cells with virtual width close to ϵ. We make this point more precise as follows. Let an ϵ-minimal cell be a cell in F ϵ which does not contain any other cell in F ϵ . Let N min ϵ (Y ) be the covering number of Y relative to the collection of ϵ-minimal cells, i.e., the smallest number of ϵ-minimal cells sufficient to cover Y . Then
where ψ is the smallest size of a feasible cell. 6 Thus, Equation (5) can be easily restated using the covering numbers N min ϵ (·) instead of N ϵ (·). Corollary: Polynomial regret. Literature on regret-minimization often states "polynomial" regret bounds of the form R(T ) =Õ(T γ ), γ < 1. While covering-number regret bounds are more precise and versatile, the exponent γ in a polynomial regret bound expresses algorithms' performance in a particularly succinct and lucid way.
For "bandits in metric spaces" the exponent γ is typically determined by an appropriately defined notion of "dimension", such as the covering dimension, 7 which succinctly captures the difficulty of the problem instance. Interestingly, the dependence of γ on the dimension d is typically of the same shape; γ = (d + 1)/(d + 2), for several different notions of "dimension". In line with this tradition, we define the width dimension:
Note that the width dimension depends on X cand and the problem instance, and is parameterized by a constant α > 0. By optimizing the choice of δ in Equation (5), we obtain the following corollary. 
The width dimension is similar to the "zooming dimension" in and "near-optimality dimension" in Bubeck et al. [2011] in the work on "bandits in metric spaces." See the full version for further discussion.
Comparison to prior work (non-adaptive discretization). One approach from prior work that is directly applicable to the dynamic contract design problem is nonadaptive discretization. This is an algorithm, call it NonAdaptive, which runs an offthe-shelf MAB algorithm, treating a set of candidate contracts X cand as arms. 8 For concreteness, and following the prior work [Kleinberg 2004; Kleinberg and Leighton 2003; , we use a well-known algorithm UCB1 [Auer et al. 2002] as an off-the-shelf MAB algorithm.
To compare AgnosticZooming with NonAdaptive, it is useful to derive several "worstcase" corollaries of Theorem 4.1, replacing N ϵ (X ϵ ) with various (loose) upper bounds. 9 COROLLARY 4.5. In the setting of Theorem 4.1, the regret of AgnosticZooming can be upper-bounded as follows:
. Here theÕ() notation hides the logarithmic dependence on T and δ.
The best known regret bounds for NonAdaptive coincide with those in Corollary 4.5 up to poly-logarithmic factors. However, the regret bounds in Theorem 4.1 may be significantly better than the ones in Corollary 4.5. We further discuss this in the next section, in the context of a specific example.
A SPECIAL CASE: THE "HIGH-LOW EXAMPLE "
We show an application of the machinery in Section 4 on a specific example. On this example AgnosticZooming significantly outperforms NonAdaptive.
The most basic special case is when there is just one non-null outcome. Essentially, each worker makes a strategic choice whether to accept or reject a given task (where "reject" corresponds to the null effort level), and this choice is fully observable. This setting has been studied before [Badanidiyuru et al. 2012 [Badanidiyuru et al. , 2013 Kleinberg and Leighton 2003; Singla and Krause 2013] ; we will call it dynamic task pricing . Here the contract is completely specified by the price p for the non-null outcome. The supply distribution is summarized by the function S(p) = Pr [accept|p] , so that the corresponding expected utility is U (p) = S(p)(v − p), where v is the value for the non-null outcome. This special case is already quite rich, because S(·) can be an arbitrary non-decreasing function. By using adaptive discretization, we achieve significant improvement over prior work; see the full version for further discussion.
We consider a somewhat richer setting in which workers' strategic decisions are not observable; this is a salient feature of our setting, called moral hazard in the contract theory literature. There are two non-null outcomes (low and high), and two non-null effort levels (low and high). Low outcome brings zero value to the requester, while high outcome brings value v > 0. Low effort level inflicts zero cost on a worker and leads to low outcome with probability 1. We assume that workers break ties between effort levels in a consistent way: high better than low better than null. (Hence, as low effort incurs zero cost, the only possible outcomes are low and high.) We will call this the high-low example; it is perhaps the simplest example that features moral hazard.
In this example, the worker's type consists of a pair (c h , θ h ), where c h ≥ 0 is the cost for high effort and θ h ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of high outcome given high effort. Note that dynamic task pricing is equivalent to the special case θ h = 1.
The following claim states a crucial property of the high-low example.
CLAIM 5.1. Consider the high-low example with a fixed supply distribution. Then Pr[high outcome | contract x] depends only on p = x(high) − x(low); denote this probability by S(p) . Moreover, S(p) is non-decreasing in p. Therefore:
• discretization error OPT(X) − OPT(X cand (ψ)) is at most 3ψ, for any ψ > 0.
Recall that X cand (ψ), the uniform mesh with granularity ψ > 0, consists of all bounded, monotone contracts with payments in ψN.
For our purposes, the supply distribution is summarized via the function S(·). Denotẽ U (p) = S(p) (v − p) . Note that U (x) is maximized by setting x(low) = 0, in which case U (x) =Ũ (p). Thus, if an algorithm knows that it is given a high-low example, it can set x(low) = 0, thereby reducing the dimensionality of the search space. Then the problem essentially reduces to dynamic task pricing with the same S(·).
However, in general an algorithm does not know whether it is presented with the high-low example (because the effort levels are not observable). So in what follows we will consider algorithms that do not restrict themselves to x(low) = 0.
"Nice" supply distribution. We focus on a supply distribution D that is "nice", in the sense that S(·) satisfies the following two properties:
is strongly concave, in the sense thatŨ ′′ (·) exists and satisfiesŨ ′′ (·) ≤ C < 0.
Here L and C are absolute constants. We call such D strongly Lipschitz-concave.
The above properties are fairly natural. For example, they are satisfied if θ h is the same for all worker types and the marginal distribution of c h is piecewise uniform such that the density is between 1 λ and λ, for some absolute constant λ ≥ 1. We show that for any choice X cand ⊂ X, AgnosticZooming has a small width dimension in this setting, and therefore small regret.
LEMMA 5.2. Consider the high-low example with a strongly Lipschitz-concave supply distribution. Then the width dimension is at most 1 2 , for any given X cand ⊂ X. Therefore, AgnosticZooming with this X cand has regret R(T |X cand ) = O(log T ) T 3/5 . We contrast this with the performance of NonAdaptive, parameterized with the natural choice X cand = X cand (ψ). We focus on R(T |X): regret w.r.t. the best contract in X. We show that AgnosticZooming achieves R(T |X) =Õ(T 3/5 ) for a wide range of X cand , whereas NonAdaptive cannot do better than R(T |X) = O(T 3/4 ) for any X cand = X cand (ψ), ψ > 0.
LEMMA 5.3. Consider the setting of Lemma 5.2. Then:
all problem instances, for any ψ > 0. 10
PROOF OF THE MAIN REGRET BOUND (THEOREM 4.1)
We now prove the main result from Section 4. Our high-level approach is to define a clean execution of an algorithm as an execution in which some high-probability events are satisfied, and derive bounds on regret conditional on the clean execution. The analysis of a clean execution does not involve any "probabilistic" arguments. This approach tends to simplify regret analysis. We start by listing some simple invariants enforced by AgnosticZooming:
INVARIANT 6.1. In each round t of each execution of AgnosticZooming: (a) All active cells are relevant, (b) Each candidate contract is contained in some active cell, (c) W t (C) ≤ 5 rad t (C) for each active composite cell C.
Note that the zooming rule is essential to ensure Invariant 6.1(c). 6.1. Analysis of the randomness DEFINITION 6.2 (CLEAN EXECUTION). An execution of AgnosticZooming is called clean if for each round t and each active cell C it holds that
LEMMA 6.3. Assume c rad ≥ 16 and T ≥ max(1 + 2 m , 18). Then:
Consequently, an execution of AgnosticZooming is clean with probability at least 1−1/T . Lemma 6.3 follows from the standard concentration inequality known as "Chernoff Bounds". However, one needs to be careful about conditioning and other details. PROOF OF LEMMA 6.3(A). Consider an execution of AgnosticZooming. Let N be the total number of activated cells. Since at most 2 m cells can be activated in any one round, N ≤ 1 + 2 m T ≤ T 2 . Let C j be the min(j, N )-th cell activated by the algorithm. (If multiple "quadrants" are activated in the same round, order them according to some fixed ordering on the quadrants.)
Fix some feasible cell C and j ≤ T 2 . We claim that
Let n(C) = n 1+T (C) be the total number of times cell C is chosen by the algorithm. For each s ∈ N: 1 ≤ s ≤ n(C) let U s be the requester's utility in the round when C is chosen for the s-th time. Further, let D C be the distribution of U 1 , conditional on the event n(S) ≥ 1. (That is, the per-round reward from choosing cell C.) Let U ′ 1 , . . . , U ′ T be a family of mutually independent random variables, each with distribution D C . Then for each n ≤ T , conditional on the event {C j = C} ∧ {n(C) = n}, the tuple (U 1 , . . . , U n ) has the same joint distribution as the tuple (U ′ 1 , . . . , U ′ n ). Consequently, applying Chernoff Bounds to the latter tuple, it follows that
Taking the Union Bound over all n ≤ T , and plugging in rad t (C j ), n t (C j ), and U t (C j ), we obtain Equation (11). Now, let us keep j fixed in Equation (11), and integrate over C. More precisely, let us multiply both sides of Equation (11) by Pr[C j = C] and sum over all feasible cells C. We obtain, for all j ≤ T 2 :
(Note that to obtain Equation (12), we do not need to take the Union Bound over all feasible cells C.) To conclude, we take the Union Bound over all j ≤ 1 + T 2 .
PROOF SKETCH OF LEMMA 6.3(B). We show that
and similarly for V − (), P + () and P − (). Each of these four statements is proved similarly, using the technique from Lemma 6.3(a). In what follows, we sketch the proof for one of the four cases, namely for Equation (13).
For a given composite cell C, we are only interested in rounds in which anchor x + (C) is selected by the algorithm. Letting n + t (C) be the number of times this anchor is chosen up to time t, let us define the corresponding notion of "confidence radius":
.
With the technique from the proof of Lemma 6.3(a), we can establish the following high-probability event:
More precisely, we can prove that by the clean execution. If C * t is composite then
. Since this holds for any candidate contract x * , the claim follows. CLAIM 6.5. In any clean execution, for each round t, the index I t (C t ) is upperbounded as follows:
For part (b), fix a contract x ∈ C t . Then:
by Equation (17) 
by Invariant 6.1(c).
For each relevant cell C, define badness ∆(C) as follows. If C is composite, ∆(C) = sup x∈C ∆(x) is the maximal badness among all contracts in C. If C is atomic and x ∈ C is the unique candidate contract in C, then ∆(C) = ∆(x). CLAIM 6.6. In any clean execution, ∆(C) ≤ O(rad t (C)) for each round t and each active cell C.
PROOF. By Claims 6.4 and 6.5, ∆(C t ) ≤ O(rad t (C t )) for each round t. Fix round t and let C be an active cell in this round. If C has never be selected before round t, the claim is trivially true. Else, let s be the most recent round before t when C is selected by the algorithm. Then ∆(C) ≤ O(rad s (C)). The claim follows since rad s (C) = rad t (C). CLAIM 6.7. In a clean execution, each cell C is selected ≤ O(log T /(∆(C)) 2 ) times.
PROOF. By Claim 6.6, ∆(C) ≤ O(rad T (C)). The claim follows from the definition of rad T in Equation (3).
Let n(x) and n(C) be the number of times contract x and cell C, respectively, are chosen by the algorithm. Then regret of the algorithm is
The next result (Lemma 6.8) upper-bounds the right-hand side of Equation (18) for a clean execution. By Lemma 6.3, this suffices to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1 LEMMA 6.8. Consider a clean execution of AgnosticZooming. For any δ ∈ (0, 1),
The proof of Lemma 6.8 relies on some simple properties of ∆(·), stated below. CLAIM 6.9. Consider two relevant cells C ⊂ C p . Then:
PROOF. To prove part (a), one needs to consider two cases, depending on whether cell C p is composite. If it is, the claim follows trivially. If C p is atomic, then C is atomic, too, and so ∆(C) = ∆(C p ) = ∆(x), where x is the unique candidate contract in C p .
For part (b), there exists a candidate contract x ∈ C. It is easy to see that ∆(x) ≤ ∆(C) (again, consider two cases, depending on whether C is composite.) So, x ∈ X ϵ . PROOF OF LEMMA 6.8. Let Σ denote the sum in question. Let A * be the collection of all cells ever activated by the algorithm. Among such cells, consider those with badness on the order of ϵ:
By Claim 6.7, the algorithm chooses each cell C ∈ G ϵ at most O(log T /ϵ 2 ) times, so n(C) ∆(C) ≤ O(log T /ϵ).
Fix some δ ∈ (0, 1) and observe that all cells C with ∆(C) ≤ δ contribute at most δT to Σ. Therefore it suffices to focus on G ϵ , ϵ ≥ δ/2. It follows that
We bound |G ϵ | as follows. Consider a cell C ∈ G ϵ . The cell is called a leaf if it is never zoomed in on (i.e., removed from the active set) by the algorithm. If C is activated in the round when cell C p is zoomed in on, C p is called the parent of C. We consider two cases, depending on whether or not C is a leaf.
(i) Assume cell C is not a leaf. Since ∆(C) < 2ϵ, C overlaps with X 2ϵ by Claim 6.9(b).
Note that C is zoomed in on in some round, say in round t − 1. Then
by the zooming rule ≤ VirtWidth(C) + 4 rad t (C) by clean execution, so rad t (C) ≤ VirtWidth(C). Therefore, using Claim 6.6, we have
It follows that C ∈ F Ω(ϵ) (X 2ϵ ). (ii) Assume cell C is a leaf. Let C p be the parent of C. Since C ⊂ C p , we have ∆(C) ≤ ∆(C p ) by Claim 6.9(a). Therefore, invoking case (i), we have
Since ∆(C) < 2ϵ, C overlaps with X 2ϵ by Claim 6.9(b), and therefore so does C p . It follows that C p ∈ F Ω(ϵ) (X 2ϵ ).
Combing these two cases, it follows that |G ϵ | ≤ (2 m + 1) F Ω(ϵ) (X 2ϵ ) . Plugging this into (19) and making an appropriate substitution ϵ → Θ(ϵ) to simplify the resulting expression, we obtain the regret bound in Theorem 4.1
SIMULATIONS
We evaluate the performance of AgnosticZooming through simulations. We compare AgnosticZooming with two versions of NonAdaptive that use, respectively, two standard bandit algorithms: UCB1 [Auer et al. 2002] and Thompson Sampling [Thompson 1933] (with Gaussian priors). For both UCB1 and AgnosticZooming, we replace the logarithmic confidence terms with small constants. 12 All three algorithms are run with X cand = X cand (ψ), where ψ > 0 is the granularity of the discretization.
Setup. We consider a version of the high-low example, as described in Section 5. We set the requester's values to V (high) = 1 and V (low) = .3. The probability of obtaining high outcome given high effort is set to θ h = .8. Thus, the worker's type is characterized by the cost c h for high effort. We consider three supply distributions:
-Uniform Worker Market : c h is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
-Homogeneous Worker Market : c h is the same for every worker.
-Two-Type Market : c h is uniformly distributed over two values, c ′ h and c ′′ h . These first two markets represent the extreme cases when workers are extremely homogeneous or extremely diverse, and the third market is one way to represent the middle ground. For each market, we run each algorithm 100 times. For Homogeneous Worker Market, c h is drawn uniformly at random from [0, 1] for each run. For Two-Type Market, c ′ h and c ′′ h are drawn independently and uniformly from [0, 1] on each run. Results. The plots can be found in the full version. Across all simulations, AgnosticZooming performs comparably to or better than NonAdaptive. In particular, its performance does not appear to suffer from large "hidden constants" that appear in the analysis. We find that AgnosticZooming converges faster than NonAdaptive when ψ is near-optimal or smaller; this is consistent with the intuition that AgnosticZooming focuses on exploring the more promising regions. When ψ is large, AgnosticZooming converges slower than NonAdaptive, but eventually achieves the same performance. Further, we find that AgnosticZooming with small ψ performs well compared to NonAdaptive with larger ψ: not much worse initially, and much better eventually.
Our simulations suggest that if time horizon T is known in advance and one can tune ψ to T , then NonAdaptive can achieve similar performance as AgnosticZooming. However, in real applications approximately optimal ψ may be difficult to compute, and the T may not be known in advance.
CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by applications to crowdsourcing markets, we define the dynamic contract design problem: a multi-round version of the principal-agent model with unobservable strategic decisions. We design an algorithm for this problem and derive regret bounds which compare favorably to prior work. Our main conceptual contribution is the adaptive discretization approach that does not rely on Lipschitz-continuity assumptions. We provably improve on the uniform discretization approach from prior work, both in the general case and in some illustrative special cases. These theoretical results are supported by simulations.
We believe that the dynamic contract design problem deserves further study. First, it is not clear whether our provable results can be improved, perhaps using substantially different algorithms and relative to other problem-specific structures. In particular, no lower bounds are currently known. Second, our adaptive discretization approach may be fine-tuned, in several different ways, to improve its performance in practice. One possible area of improvement is selecting a feasible cell in a "smoother", probabilistic way, e.g., as in Thompson Sampling [Thompson 1933 ]. Third, one needs deeper insights into the structure of the (static) principal-agent problem, primarily in order to upperbound discretization errors of the form OPT(X cand ) − OPT(X cand (ϵ)) and OPT(X cand (ϵ)) − OPT(X cand (ϵ ′ )), ϵ > ϵ ′ > 0. Also of interest is the effect of restricting our attention to monotone contracts. Fourth, a (much) more extensive analysis of special cases is in order. The most immediate direction is deriving lucid corollaries from the current regret bounds, preferably also optimizing the choice of candidate contracts. One can also design improved algorithms and derive specialized lower bounds.
Going beyond our current model, a natural (but probably very difficult) direction is to incorporate budget constraints, extending the results on online task pricing [Badanidiyuru et al. 2012 [Badanidiyuru et al. , 2013 Singla and Krause 2013] .
